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Abstract
This work extends a model of simulating influence in a network of stochastic edge
dynamics to account for polarization. The model built upon is termed Dynamic Com-
municators and seeks to understand the process which produces low volume high influ-
ence amongst users. This model is extended to introduce the effects polarization. The
fundamental assumption of the model is that a parameter of importance governs the
rate of message responsiveness. With the introduction of relative incremental changes
according to the response incurred in adjacent nodes receiving content, the changes in
the power brokerage of a network can be examined. This provides a content agnostic
interpretation for the desire to proliferate content amongst peers. From the results of
the simulations, the analysis shows that a lack of polarization incrementally develops a
more level discussion network with more even response rates whereas the polarization
introduction leads to a gradual increase in response rate disparity.
Keywords: polarization, stochastic model, discussion dynamics, influencers, social net-
works
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1 Introduction
There has been an increasing interest in the analysis of polarization in social networks Sin-
clair (2014); Stonecash (2018) as a larger proportion of the political discourse happens online.
Indicators of instability in social networks can be seen as forward predictors of potential dis-
ruptions in the political decision making amongst citizens Abramowitz (2015) (shows that
the disagreement in political ideologies is increasing over time in the USA). The work of Bal-
dassarri and Bearman (2007); Baldassarri and Gelman (2008) supports the observed trend,
and motivates the study of the topic from a modeling perspective to infer the fundamental
dynamics of the process in the hope that hypothetical negative consequences can be avoided.
Polarization can lead to the break of communities as described in the historic example of
the Zachary karate club network Zachary (1977) (a group of a sports club through a dis-
agreement created a split/separation). The Zachary karate club example shows how the
monitoring of the network structure and dynamics can be used to predict a break which on
a larger scale could signal a much larger set of consequences. To understand the underly-
ing process in more detail we develop a model to capture the effects of the communication
influence a network has before and after a polarization event to determine whether certain
members have a potential return from the introduction of a disagreement.
A recent model that analyzes the formation of the polarization process is, Davies (2017).
It uses the basic concepts of homophily and accessiblity as potential links within a subset
pool of potential new contacts; as a means to discover homophilic edges towards users. The
potential to complete a local network by pooling from enough users with similar features is
taken as a basic premise in the edge creation for the network. A simulation for the change
of opinions is modeled with a binary voter model Clifford and Sudbury (1973). Although
this captures the competition for ideas to be reflected upon a node locality it does not fully
represent different magnitudes of influence that are accumulated by the ’network effect’ over
time via the message exchange mechanisms. The desire to control a network appears to be
in many ways a possible asset as discussed to a great extent in Benkler (2006) (The wealth
of networks). Obtaining control of a network is observed to be something actively sought
out by members, and succeeding is presumably a transfer of this ’wealth’.
In this paper we look at the effects of an established even split between members of a
messaging exchange network of sizes where it is considered feasible that all members can send
messages directly to each other. The concern is on whether the mechanisms of a negative
view of content originating from members expresssing an opposing view of a discourse will
incur a direction for understanding motives and incentives. Given a user is participating
in actions which may result in a fractioning of their community would the result bring a
question to certain members who must ask whether the result will beneficial to them or not
after the continuation of the polarization behaviors. This benefit is considered to be related
to whether they can be expected to have a greater contribution to their community from
the message exchanges they participate in. The results will be analyzed by the extent of the
influence they have on their peers to respond to their messages by propagating them. Instead
of assuming a state variable change, as in the binary voting model, the message propogation is
considered to be an indicator of a state change for the ideological positioning. The discussion
leaders can be seen as a source of information for the group and if the responses are focused
upon a small or large portion of the members, different overall dynamics can be interpreted.
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Recent research on the political tensions in Catalonia look into whether this polarization is
driven by a small group of people with large societal influence Barrio and Rodr´ıguez-Teruel
(2017) which can provide insight into the nature of communications of highly leveraged
influence on opinions for societal decision making when a distribution is far from uniform.
The difference between homophily and influence is examined on a large messaging network in
Aral et al. (2009) and the findings show that influence plays a smaller role than homophily.
Therefore, in the equations for the firing rules in this work, the homophily is the driving
force for the influence. This is one of the motivations behind this research. The state of a
node’s affiliation is taken into account during the message response generation rather than
attempting the inference of a latent variable under an specific representation space.
The model of dynamic communicators Mantzaris and Higham (2012) replicates the effect
of efficient power brokering over a temporal dynamic network defined over a set of transient
edges induced from direct messaging. In this model the nodes of the network proceed to
send messages via a stochastic message creation and dissemination mechanism. The model
represents the dynamics for creating and spreading content as well as the activity decision
for a node’s engagement when a directed edge is created towards it (receives a message).
The factor determining the action that a node has once a message is received (directed edge
towards it) and whether that content is promoted through it subsequently as a proxy for
its spread is determined by a parameter of importance. A message is likely to be spread if
it originates from a node with a large allocated importance relative to the other network
members. The message is assumed to be without memory so that although the original
content creation can be from the discussion leader, those at the bottom of the importance
hierarch cannot utilize this fact for subsequent content disseminations. The modeling per-
spective takes into account piggy backing where repetition and coinciding discussions within
a temporal dependency can be utilized to self promote and is explained in the methodology
section.
This direction focuses upon building a model which develops macrodynamics from the
’bottom-up’, Katz and Paul (1955); Schelling (2006) which is used to uncover a simple
model which portrays many of the phenomena we observe in practice. The message passing
framework is chosen to encapsulate the social modeling paradigm as a useful abstraction.
This is shown in the work of Hedstro¨m (2005) which emphasizes the mechanisms of entities
and activities being organized to bring about the change from their inter-linking. The
disruption in the pathways of information Kossinets et al. (2008) for the communities to
communicate with other members is assumed to be reflected in the probabilities to create
content as a result of exposure due to a node with that is aligned with their local view of
what is included or excluded and support for the polarity representation used in our model.
This modeling approach of an importance factor governs the firing rate for edge connec-
tions and fits the influence dynamics observed in the dataset of ENRON Klimt and Yang
(2004) where the influential effects of topp tier employees produced long downstream prop-
agations of content. This observation was measured using the methodologies of Grindrod
et al. (2011); Grindrod and Higham (2014). We use the foundation of the model of dynamic
communicators to build upon it to explain the effects of importance value changes over the
evolution of the model. A mechanism for incrementing the main factor of influence based on
the history of participation in message disseminations introduced with single step memory
assumptions. Increments will produce an increased chance for other members of the network
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to respond to their content via replication and dissemination.
The work in Baldassarri and Bearman (2007) develops a formal model of social influence
for microinteractions which leads to macrostructural outcomes regarding the perception of
polarization. It encapsulates the concept that personal influence can be directed from sensi-
tive discussions arising from opinions of diverse issues. Our firing equation for the influence
propogation in Dynamic communicators has analogous forms in research such as eq.1 of the
paper. The choice for the max of the denominator in relation to the edge in question, is
seen there as well for normalization. In this model we do not represent the topics but the
affiliation of the polar sides which is common in community disfunction.
Their model describes a stochastic process where influence is based on a distance measure
from a set of local actors, which avoids an explicit spatial representation as Axelrod (1997).
The work here also removes the explicit spatial structure for the model interactions as it
resembles more of the data analytics gathered. This is largely due to privacy concerns and
that most of the data is too sparse in regards to the density required to perform an accurate
spatial temporal modeling of the micro interactions. A key aspect of this model and related
ones is that the mechanism for preference does not impose connectivity constraints. Our work
is also based on the assumption that participants of a polar or non-polarized community can
interact equivalently.
Temporal network analysis has many methodologies to be used in order to measure
aspects of the information contained in the datasets, Holme and Sarama¨ki (2012). The ability
for messages to be spread around a network and the ability to initiate message responses
from peers in a community is assumed to be indicator of influence to be captured from
the stochastic simulations produced here as in various methodologies in the area. The
applications of these principles applies widely and to a diverse set of datasets such as its
effectiveness for analyzing the connectivity of phone calls between academics Eagle et al.
(2009) where the edges are sparse in comparison to the duration and content density of the
presence of the edge.
2 Methodology
The work of Dynamic Communicators Mantzaris and Higham (2012) offers an intuitively
reasonable explanatory mechanism for how the phenomena measured from a complete net-
work (members have full visibility and communication channels of all members) can arise to
produce dynamic centrality. Namely the effect where nodes producing low numbers of mes-
sages which spread to a large number of nodes indirectly through intermediaries/relays. This
is done without explicitly defining a differentiation of the messages that favors a proportion
of edges to have this property and therefore allows for a homogeneous event space. Infor-
mation exchanges which have temporal dependencies rely upon a series of knock on effects.
It is assumed that these events of a response are generated through a local decision criteria
and are not aware of the mean field effect of the identical content impact elsewhere in the
network. Although the individual considerations regarding a node’s discretion on whether
to propogate a message it receives or not is a complex process the macro behavior of the
knock on effect is the main focus. The parameterization for these decisions are represented
as a parameter of each node which is its importance value ranked among the other nodes;
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ln : 0 < l1 ≤ l2 ≤ . . . ≤ lN . Although this may seem simplistic, it does represent a ranked
list for characteristics of popularity, influence, and other effects such as authority when this
is directly linked to the response of a content receiving event.
It is assumed there is a Basal rate for which nodes generate new content, b, as a probabil-
ity which is uniform across the network and time. These events produce cb events uniformly
distributed to all the other nodes. Each event is realized as the production of a directed edge
and cb is the number of those directed edges. Upon being a destination node for an edge,
the probability response function is defined for a node at a time point k, as the stochastic:
r[k]n :=
∑N
i=1 li(A
[k])in
1 + lN
∑N
i=1(A
[k])in
. (1)
Each time a node will respond, a successful spread of (assumed related content) occurs (s
[k]
n ),
creating cr links uniformly chosen across the whole network. Implied in this response effect is
a temporal dependency of content association. It is connected to the motivation for network
members to obtain rewards to sharing important information towards other members in a
timely fashion.
We add to the model a mechanism of rewarding participation in stimulating a successful
response in another node. This is done by having an increment in node’s importance value.
By increasing the value ln this will result in a relatively higher expectation of successful
message response in future directed edges produced. We impose that ei,j, i /∈ j, |j| = cr for
unique edges to be produced and that they are not self referencing. Any node that has an
edge towards another node which produces a response in k+1, can receive an increase (incre-
ment) of their importance value. This occurs regardless of any content presumptions in the
model. It focuses solely upon the temporal ordering for the related attributes assumed when
incrementing the values. The importance vector is not normalized since the denominator
in eq1, 1 + lN
∑N
i=1(A
[k])in, provides for a relative measure, and social media platforms in
general are not known to scale the analytics of popularity (friend number, retweet numbers
etc) according to a network aggregate.
A low ranking node in terms of perceived importance incurs the same increment upon
their li value when inducing a response through a directed edge. In practice this may differ
in how other nodes see incoming messages (content streams) either digitally or through
traditional social interactions. We are assuming that from the perspective of the destination
node for the content, that the aggregation of all the incoming messages at a particular time
point coincides with a similar discussion context. They are then perceived to be relevant in
nature for the temporal context (increases in granularity of the samples will reinforce this
assumption), and then uniformly attributed for incurring a successful response, s
[k]
n :
l′i = (s
[k]
n × (A[k])in + li). (2)
This provides the motivation for the exchange activity and effort to participate in the influ-
ence other nodes in the network. As these increments will enable a user to have longer range
of content exposure and recognition feedback.
It can expected that over many iterations this initial max difference in node importance
max(l) − min(l) would become less significant. This difference can be assumed to remain
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constant over multiple simulations and if max(l) − min(l) = diff is considered to be ap-
proximately a constant this value for large k becomes insignificant in comparison to the
minimum min(li) >> diff . With a uniform addition of importance that is accumulated
due to piggy-backing from content and dark retweeting (removing original authorship labels)
the minimization of the initial starting points is anticipated. This reflects the idea of a hy-
pothetical ’ergodic’ state destination for a network of users with full visibility over enough
time.
The evolution of the importance becomes essential for the study of the results of polar-
ization since there are non-heterogeneous perceptions of content sentiment. As responses
induce importance increments to refrain from promoting opposing content, this must not be
re-distributed in the network. The nodes having a degree of freedom to reward nodes that
more effectively create information specific to a group-think is a mechanism in the dynamics
that forms acknowledgement from the group.
To represent a polarization regime; each node is put into one of two different groups,
the odds and the evens. There should be an approximately equal amount of total impor-
tance of the nodes for each side and this break in homogeneity affects the response function
probabilities by changing the perceived importance from each node. Taking the case where
mod(n, 2) = 0, n is on the even labelled group and the polarized importance contributions
for its response function becomes:
leven =
{
li i is even
li × (−1) i is odd
(3)
and the respective columns in the adjacency matrix used by each calculation of the response
function becomes:
r
[k]
n∈even :=
∑N
i=1
(
(A[k])∗n · leven
)
1 + lN
∑N
i=1(A
[k])in
(4)
With the straight forward swapping for the odd case. Having this positive in-group weighting
and negative out-group weighting while maintaining the ability for nodes to send messages
through transient links is what is explored in the results section. The changes will be
manifested in a change in the distribution for the importance values. If the relatively constant
value of the difference between the largest and smallest values of the importance changes
this would reflect a paradigm shift. Given an understanding of that process a premeditated
instantiation could then benefit a member who has more network wealth to lose from a
uniform content response probability than the alternative case’s results. Given a set of
dynamics for the creation and spread of information modeled as messages over discrete time,
a stochastic simulation for the spread of information can be produced and the time ordered
events analyzed as a temporal network.
3 Results
We produce simulated data as described in the methodology section where there are two
states of the simulation; a homogeneous community in which content is passed with no
differentiation between point of origin of the edges and then a polarized perspective of the
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importance of content according to node origin is imposed as in eq 3. The number of nodes
chosen is 40 according to the Dunbar number of community sizes where we can expect such
a group to be able to message all other members uniformly, Gonc¸alves et al. (2011); Dunbar
(1993). This number is also chosen in some of the related research into public discourse on
political discussions such as Adamic and Glance (2005) which studies 40 blogger accounts
that were deemed to be A-list in 2004 prior to the US presidential election. The time period
for the study was a snapshot of 1K blogs each day and we therefore also use the 1K interval
for our model here for the figures (a separate blog analysis of opposing political blogs in
Hargittai et al. (2008) also used 40 blogs which interlinked).
Figure 1 shows the heatmaps of the before and after polarization simulations to depict
the ability of nodes to initiate a content spread response from edges they create or assist
in transmitting. The simulation runs for two periods of 8K iterations and shown in each
cell is number of responses a node i participated in initiating a response in j by creating an
edge towards node j at time k prior to j further creating an edge in k + 1. This spread of
information, by creating links, is counted in each entry and proportional to the color scheme
in the legend. The subfigure on the left shows the pre-polarization and the one on the
right the post-polarization. The range of values is not rescaled between the two subfigures
because in the nature of the communication the relative values within the time periods is
the most important feature of the dynamics to investigate. Having a relative difference in
communication change is what is assumed as a better indicator of ranked influence than
the absolute value. Without introducing a constraint for messages to be exchanged, the
polarized state depicts a reduced contribution for spread between the different sides of the
network (odds-evens). It also reduces the relative influence of the nodes at the lower end
of the spectrum (as is also shown in the next figures) even within their homogeneous polar
affiliation. The heatmap cell score values are calculated using;
scorei,j =
T∑
k=1
s
[k]
i→j. (5)
Here s is the item indexed array for the successful responses r
[k]
i→j at time point k.
The feature that the nodes which are not ranked on the top of the importance send
relatively less messages indicates a phenomenon of ’indimidation’. This can be explained by
the numerator of the response function unlikely to produce a firing unless the origin of the
content is highly ranked to counter balance opposition in a disagreement. It can loosely be
perceived as a defence mechanism to adhere to content spread by the leaders of the fractions
when there is doubt originating from another side.
Figure 2 shows investigates the relative values of the network members’ ability to trigger
an information spread (response). These plots show the response count of all the nodes in
relation to the lowest or second lowest nodes according to how they were initially ranked
nodes in the importance values li. The subplot on the left is for the relative values according
to node1 (lowest ranked) and in the subplot on the right is the relative value towards node2
(second lowest ranked). This checks to see if the relationship changes fundamentally across
the groups on which a polarization is defined. These relative values are found separately for
the polarized case which is in orange and for the homogeneous case which is in blue. This
relative value towards the lowest end gives an idea of the distribution of influence between
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Figure 1: Each heatmap shows the simulated accumulation of participation in initiating a
response of information dissemination from one node towards a different one i→ j. On the
left is the pre polarization simulation results and on the right post polarization (time points
1-8K, and 8K-16K). We can see that polarization reduces greatly the cross community com-
munication and the total communication produced by nodes lower in the importance ranking.
The reduction can be connected to an interpretation of ’intimidation’ when messages arrive
from opposite sides of the discussion.
the top and bottom as a spectrum for the distance of how much more content is spread
at the ends of the ranking. The blue bars show that the increase in ranking does result in
more response triggers in other nodes, but the polarized case in orange shows a substantially
greater increase upon that. The significant feature is that the high ranking nodes increase
their ability to send messages towards other nodes in relation to those at the lower end
of the spectrum when the network is polarized. This increase in disparity is also seen for
the comparison with the lowest member on an opposing member of the discussion. The
reason the heights are not completely monotonic across the node numbers is that due to the
stochasticity there is room for the nodes to create more or fewer responses in other nodes
which incurs reinforcing feedback. The heights for these bars are measured by the response
influence pre and post polarization by the following:
scorei,T ′ =
∑T ′
k=1 s
[k]
i
T ′
, (6)
and the ratio of the node triggering capability with another node is:
scorei′,T ′
scorei,T ′
. (7)
Here we choose i to be values 1, 2 and the reason is to show there is not much significant
difference between the lower end of the spectrum for each polarized side of the message
exchange network.
Figure 3 shows the effect of polarization on the relative power of the top half of the
influential nodes in respect to the bottom half bottom = [1, . . . , N/2], top = [N/2 + 1, . . . , N ].
The model runs for 8K iterations as a homogeneous network of message exchanges until the
subsequent introduction of polarization for the remaining time 8K points. The dashed line
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Figure 2: The plots show the relative total number of effective response events that the
nodes have participated in, with relation to the last and second last nodes in terms of initial
starting importance. On the left the relative values compared to the last ranked node and on
the right to the second last ranked node. The pre and post polarization values are separated
to examine the differences between the ends of the message power brokerage spectrum. In
blue are the pre polarization values and in orange the post polarization values. Both plots
show the same trend and most importantly that the disparity between the top and bottom
nodes increases after polarization.
identifies the point where the polarization is introduced. To measure the amount of influence
a certain group of nodes has over another group of nodes to promote a response of message
replication, pre and post polarization. To measure the running average of one group’s ability
to initiate message spread in comparison to other remaining group a sum over the s
[k]
n values
is produced. Given a subset of nodes Ntop from the total number of nodes N the rest of the
nodes in the network are Nbottom = N−Ntop. The average number of node message spreading
is measured from the first time point to another time point at 1K iteration intervals with
the final time point being T and itermediate time points at T ′ (for the top nodes):
scoretop =
∑T ′
k=1
∑N
n=Ntop
s
[k]
n
T ′
. (8)
For the ratio of the top to bottom:
scoretop
scorebottom
=
∑T ′
k=1
∑Ntop
n=1 s
[k]
n∑T ′
k=1
∑Nbottom
n=1 s
[k]
n
. (9)
In the simulations here ntop is chosen to be N/2 and is 20 nodes here. From the figure it is
apparent that the non-polarized regime result in a decreasing trajectory of power disparity.
This results in a more even probability distribution for the nodes across the network. In
terms of the users it means that all members of the group have a more equal chance of having
their content responded to. The interpretation is that polarization introduces intimidation
via uncertainty in the overall accumulation of importance of the content when there are
conflicting assignments. The discussion leaders therefore will be of the few able to participate
in message responses and then that will increase there importance without the lower half in
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that time period. This trend post polarizations provides an avenue for the original discussion
disparity to be re-instantiated and obtain more control over the spread of content between
the users.
Figure 3: Response initiating power (dissemination power) of the top 20 nodes over the
bottom 20 nodes. The first 8000 time points is prior to the polarization of the network and
the subsequent time points represents the polarization period. Prior to polari The top 20
nodes gain increased power once polarization is introduced by using the feature that nodes of
less importance cannot cancel out intervening messages from another side of the discussion.
Therefore the discussion leaders exclusively manage to increment their importance as a result
of the polarization introduction. Such processes will produce benefits for the members which
were initially at the top of the important ranking list. (dashed line is where the polarization
is introduced)
In Figure4 the simulation is performed for the case of 150 nodes which represents the outer
reach of the Dunbar circles as it is expected that humans cannot hold more than 150 social
ties due to cognitive constraints. This investigation checks the model for the phenomenon
observed in Figure3 and whether the top half of the nodes benefit from a polarization event.
For this number of users which is the theoretical limit of maintained social ties kept active, we
produce the ratio of the top to bottom over the same number of iterations. The polarization
point (indicated by the dashed line) is introduced at the same number of iterations, 8K,
and the same principal effect is observed. A monotonic decrease of the response ratio of
the top vs the bottom until the polarization event occurs in which the top ranked users in
terms of the importance ratio obtain a monotonic increase during the exchange of content
where opposition is present. The model therefore shows that the phenomenon that members
of the leading importance users for spreading content through other members benefits from
polarization and that this is not an artifact associated with the network size.
The ability for a low ranking node to be able to increase its importance influence by par-
ticipating in response firings which coincide temporally with high ranking nodes is responsible
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Figure 4: Response initiating power (dissemination power) of the top 75 nodes over the
bottom 75 nodes. The first 8000 time points are prior to the polarization of the network
and the following time points represents the polarization period. The top 75 nodes gain
increased response iniaiting power once polarization is introduced by using the feature that
nodes of less importance cannot cancel out intervening messages from another side of the
discussion. The polarization event benefits the high ranking nodes. (dashed line is where
the polarization is introduced)
for their increase in importance over time in a non-polarized discussion. Considering the 40
user case, node 40 and 1 both send a message at the same time with equal uniform probabil-
ity to a node i, and the firing of a sequence of messages is equally attributed to both nodes.
It may be seen a fault of the model to not accurately attribute the responsibility for the
accumulated effort in the numerator for this activity, but this encapsulates the feature that
nodes can mimic the images of higher ranked nodes with techniques such as ’dark’ tweeting
(removing credit of origin and repeating Azman et al. (2012)). Another process is that nodes
do not separate repeater and origin credit (sharing/retweeting) which is possible for those
that simply copy valuable content. This goes against the Matthew effect of the rich get
richer Baraba´si and Albert (1999); Perc (2014) for the natural occurance in a homogeneous
community lacking polarization and complete view. To some degree this reinforces a concept
introduced in Katz and Paul (1955) that frequent interaction leads to attitude conformity.
From the point where polarization is introduced we can see that the accumulated power
of the top half of the network nodes begins to consistently increase over their historical
average. The reasoning is that given an expected number of messages received from other
nodes in the network, there will be an equal likelihood of nodes in the same group and
opposing group, and that only in the situations where the nodes participating from the
same group have a large importance will the overall contribution to fire be positive and
produce a response. This models a type of competition for activating nodes to trigger a
firing and only happens when there is a large positive perception of the current status of
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the incoming messages. This incoming summation of importance is one-sided sentiment
which perceives certain nodes as positive and the rest as negative. This coincides with the
observations of Adamic and Glance (2005) which saw that there is clustering between the
groups and differences in the interlinking due to the edge dynamics. The edge dynamics there
produced in the analyzed data a similar effect through a simple competitive importance
reward iteration. The work of Hargittai et al. (2008) has a similar static image of the
polarized states during the following political cycle of 2008, where the figures show a limited
number of interlinking between communities and indications of focal points of edges within
each of the two groups. The continual growth of the influential nodes where those on the
bottom half are continuously reducing their response rate makes them more ’passive’ as
they receive but not spread content in an influential manner. This reflects the findings in
Romero et al. (2011) from twitter datasets which differentiates influential from popular; as
the response mechanism here measures a similar tweet mechanism where influence includes
a mechanism of spreading.
We can see that polarization occurs within an environment where there is room for
disagreement and perceived importance plays a role in overcomming a threshold for relaying
the message to the rest of the network. In effect we are simulating through a modification
of a general stochastic framework the perception of confidence. This confidence factor is in
its basic form here, the overall importance of the current content received at a given time
point. There can be identifiability considerations; such as the variability of the reference
to the polarized discussion topics which are interleaved, but these are omitted as a possible
extension.
4 Conclusions
The framework of Dynamic Communicators Mantzaris and Higham (2012) provides a basic
general framework to explore the ability of nodes to transit content to each other in a
stochastic message passing network. The extent of how a node can ’influence’ another node
it is connected to is measured by the number of responses it can initiate. This influence
measurement is represented by a parameter of importance which is allowed to increase with
a successful edge initiation response from the transient edges produced. The analysis of the
simulations examined changes in the power brokerage between nodes when a polarization
event is introduced. The simulations measure the disparity between the ability for nodes
to have their content spread by intermediates. The initial relative values of the largest
importance value holders, in comparison with the lower end of the spectrum are shown
over iterations of the stochastic dynamics. This process of representing importance reflects
many scenarios such as increasing the responsiveness of nodes towards those with close
proximity to information of rich content that certain members initially bring from an external
environment. Other reasons could exist such as a familiarity with all users in networks where
a complete view is possible (this relates to networks without imposed hierarchical structure).
In summary the results show that over time, members of the network, through incre-
mental improvements in their perceived importance, develop a more uniform rate of content
responses from their peers. When a polarization event is introduced this incurs a penalty
for the lower ranked nodes to be able to have their content disseminated and the disparity
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between the high ranked and low ranked users increases. This mirrors our intuitive under-
standing that networks without shocks should stabilize to a more uniform distribution over
time. Future work would entail examining more intricate network connectivities that reflect
the environmental costs for various nodes to communicate together in. Reflecting upon the
well known case study of the Zachary Karate club Zachary (1977), this provides insight into
the plausible insentives the leaders of the two fractions of the disagreement may have had
regardless of the self reported motives.
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